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Abstract 
 
The ‘Singapore Model’ has constituted the only second explicit attempt by the Communist 
Party of China (CPC) to learn from a foreign country following Mao Zedong’s pledge to 
contour ‘China’s tomorrow’ on the Soviet Union experience during the early 1950s. This 
paper critically evaluates policy transfers from Singapore to China in the post-Mao era. It re-
examines how this Sino-Singaporean regulatory engagement came about historically 
following Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Singapore in 1978, and offers a careful re-reading of the 
degree to which actual policy borrowing by China could transcend different state ideologies, 
abstract ideas and subjective attitudes. Particular focus is placed on the effects of CPC cadre 
training in Singapore universities and policy mutation within two government-to-government 
projects, namely the Suzhou Industrial Park and the Tianjin Eco-City. The paper concludes 
that the ‘Singapore Model’, as applied in post-Mao China, casts institutional reforms as an 
open-ended process of policy experimentation and adaptation that is fraught with tension and 
resistance. 
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内容提要 
 
‘新加坡模式’是 1950年代早期毛泽东誓言以苏联经验塑造‘中国的明天’后中国共产党第
二次明确表明学习的外国对象。本文评价后毛时代中国对新加坡经验的学习和政策的
传送。著者重新审视邓小平 1978年到访新加坡后中国在监管领域上借鉴新加坡经验的
历史起源，而重新诠释新加坡对中国实际的政策传送可否跨越意识形态，抽象理念和
主观态度的差异。本文仔细分析新加坡大学培训对中共党员回国后的影响和中新政府
在苏州和天津合作项目中的政策传送和突变。分析结果显示‘新加坡模式’应用于后
毛时代中国反映了中共制度改革上的开放性和实验性，也凸现改革过程中的张力和阻
力。 
 
关键词：中国；新加坡模式; 政策传送；政策突变； 借鉴经验  
 
 
This is the accepted version for publication by The China Quarterly. Copyright has been assigned to 
the journal, and the paper will appear in a revised form subsequent to editorial input by the journal’s 
proprietor.  
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Introduction 
Much has been made of the significance of the 1992 ‘southern tour’ of the-then ‘Paramount 
Leader’ of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Deng Xiaoping, in instituting a new round of 
socioeconomic reforms in China. Relatively underplayed but not lacking in historical 
significance was his ‘southern tour’ of Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore in November 
1978. Recounting this visit, the former Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, described 
Deng’s tour “shocked him [Deng] because he expected three backward cities. Instead he 
saw three modern cities and he knew that communism – the politics of the iron rice bowl – 
did not work”1. This “shock” jumpstarted a deepening engagement with the regulatory regime 
in Singapore, previously labelled the “running dog of imperialism” (diguozhuyi zougou 帝国主
义走狗) by the CPC propagandistic machine. Delegations began to visit Singapore informally 
in the 1980s, including Jiang Zemin, who succeeded Deng as China’s next leader, and a 
‘Singapore fever’ (xinjiapo re 新加坡热) quickly developed across Chinese policymaking 
circles after Deng’s imploration to CPC cadres in 1992: “Learn from the world, especially 
from Singapore. There is good social order there. They govern with discipline. We should 
draw from their experience – and we will do even better than they.”2  
More delegations were deployed to Singapore in the 1990s. The current Chinese 
president, Xi Jinping, went on one of these visits as a city-level official. A bilateral agreement 
was signed in February 1994 in Beijing to facilitate expertise transfer in the realm of urban 
and industrial management – portrayed by Singaporean policymakers as a government-to-
government (G-to-G) ‘software transfer’ – to the ancient city of Suzhou. Subsequent G-to-G 
collaborations were launched in Tianjin (2008) and Chongqing (2015). The regulatory 
engagement became further institutionalized with the signing of two agreements in 1997 and 
2001 to facilitate short attachments to key regulatory agencies in Singapore and longer-term 
enrolment in Master-degree programs offered by the Nanyang Technological University 
                                           
1
 SPIEGEL 2005. Interview with Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew: “It’s stupid to be afraid”. 8 August. 
Ref. To 1981. 
2
 Deng 1993, 378-379. 
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(NTU) and the National University of Singapore (NUS). More recently, the CPC’s 
enchantment with Singaporean neo-authoritarianism appears to have transcended the 
domains of urban public administration and industrial policy. This is interesting – if not also 
surprising – as it comes after reported concerns about the “cracks in the Singapore model” 
following the ruling People’s Action Party’s (PAP) weakest ever electoral performance in 
20113. With the PAP’s landslide electoral victory of September 2015 suggesting it managed 
to reduce the socioeconomic problems that triggered a loss of confidence in its governance, 
it appears there are new lessons to be drawn on addressing social discontent.  
This paper evaluates the emergence and effects of lesson drawing and policy 
transfers from Singapore to China in the post-Mao era. It has two objectives. First, it re-
examines how this Sino-Singaporean regulatory engagement – only the second overt 
attempt to learn from a particular country after Mao Zedong pledged during the 1950s to 
contour ‘China’s tomorrow’ on the Soviet Union prototype – came to be. Second, the paper 
provides a twofold evaluation of the concrete policies and ideas drawn from Singapore. It 
begins by assessing the CPC’s annual cadre training and exchange programs through 
critical observations from Chinese scholars and policymakers. The constraints of 
implementing G-to-G policy transfers are then illustrated through a critical review of 
policymakers’ comments and existing research on the Suzhou and Tianjin G-to-G ‘software 
transfers’.  
Placed within a broad historical framework, this spectrum of evidence shows how 
Singaporean-derived lessons and policies mutated when rolled out across Chinese shores. 
Indeed, inflows of ideas and policies continue to be refracted – if at times actively resisted – 
by all levels of the party-state apparatus. At one level, this reinforces Huff’s contention that 
the Singaporean experience “is unlikely to be replicated elsewhere, not only because the 
Republic is a city-state, but also because few others can develop services exports reliant on 
location, because of the unacceptability in many other polities of a heavy foreign economic 
presence, and because of difficulties in effecting the same degree of government control as 
                                           
3
 People’s Daily 2011. “Cracks appear in the Singapore model.” 23 May. 
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in Singapore.” 4  At another level, the mutation and, in the case of the G-to-G projects, 
territorial containment of policies, ideas and philosophies from Singapore reinforces 
Shambaugh’s observation that foreign ideas/practices have been proactively re-adapted to 
local contexts in China5. Viewed as an aggregated process over time, however, existing 
research remains unclear whether the overt ‘learning’ engagements with Singapore-based 
institutions and firms are of more political rather than practical value for current and future 
rounds of institutional reforms across China. This paper will address this lacuna. 
The discussion is organized in four parts. Section 2 reviews extant research on 
lesson drawing and policy transfers and establishes the conceptual parameters that frame 
the empirical analysis. The geographical-historical conditions that underpinned the China-
Singapore strategic engagement are presented in section 3. Section 4 lists and evaluates the 
different dimensions of Sino-Singaporean lesson drawing and policy transfers over the past 
three decades. The relationship between policy mutation and Chinese policymakers’ 
persistence in learning from the Singaporean experience is assessed in the conclusion. 
 
 
Conceptualizing lesson drawing and policy transfers 
National policymaking is a multi-dimensional and an increasingly cross-border process. This 
phenomenon is widely connoted by the concepts of ‘lesson drawing’ and ‘policy transfer’. 
Rose identifies five different degrees of ‘lesson drawing’. Copying is the “adoption more or 
less intact of a programme already in effect in another jurisdiction”6. It does not consider 
cultural, historic and socio-political contexts that could be highly variegated within and 
between countries. A step removed from copying, emulation involves adapting foreign 
policies to domestic conditions. Hybridization is a “combination of elements of programmes 
from two different places” 7 . Inspiration is not directly linked to drawing lessons; rather, 
policies implemented elsewhere are used as stimuli for formulating new domestic programs. 
                                           
4
 Huff 1995a, 753. 
5
 Shambaugh (2008: 103); cf. de Jong (2013). 
6
 Rose, 1991, 22. 
7
 Rose, 1991, 22. 
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These five degrees constitute varying dimensions through which ideas, policies, institutions 
and ideologies move between places. 
First developed by Dolowitz and Marsh, policy transfer refers to a “process in which 
knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political 
setting (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, 
institutions and ideas in another political setting”8. Where case studies on ‘lesson drawing’ 
focuses on assessing shifts in policy content as they are implemented in new locations, the 
related but relatively differentiated policy transfer literature illustrates how specific actors 
enable policies and practices to move across different jurisdictions. Dolowitz and Marsh 
highlight three factors that impede successful transfers, namely insufficient information in the 
importing location, incomplete transfer of policy content and inappropriate transfer of policies 
without regard to context9. This corresponds with geographical work that demonstrate how 
place-specific conditions are more “than mere background scenery to the policy actors’ 
performance”; policies “may be crossing borders ever more ‘freely’, but this is not yielding a 
flat earth of standardized outcomes or some socio-institutional monoculture”10. What typically 
ensue, instead, are mutations in ideas, attitudes and policies. 
Research has further demonstrated how cross-border flows of ideas and policies do 
not always follow a seamless state-to-state pattern. As Stone cogently argues, “policy 
transfer takes place in a multi-organisational context. The transfer of policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions and ideas happens within regional associations and between 
international organisations”11. Relations between different contexts in the form of multi-actor 
policy networks and “policy assemblages” in and through city-regions also strongly impact 
outcomes of lesson drawing and policy transfers12 . These observations largely apply to 
Chinese policymakers’ ‘learning process’ from Singapore: multiple domestic transfer agents 
and TNCs are involved, as are different levels of the party-state apparatus in China. Some of 
                                           
8
 Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 5 
9
 Dolowitz and Marsh 2000 
10
 Peck 2011, 780, 781; see also Peck and Theodore 2010; Prince 2012. 
11
 Stone 2003, 17. 
12
 Evans and Davies 1999; Temenos and McCann 2013; cf. McCann and Ward 2011. 
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these “regional associations” have gone on to form quasi-autonomous arrangements with 
government-linked firms from Singapore 13 , such as the production of the Guangzhou 
Knowledge City, the Singapore-Sichuan High-Tech Innovation Park in Chengdu and the Jilin 
Food Zone. The Sino-Singaporean lesson drawing and policy transfer process must thus be 
evaluated in terms of its geographical-historical variegation.  
Aligning with and developing these conceptual and empirical contributions, the next 
two sections will explore how specific political and economic actors developed favourable 
conditions for lesson drawing and policy mobility between China and Singapore. However, 
the existence of different types of lesson drawing and the mutation of policies in the 
territorially-contained G-to-G projects exemplify the constitutive – if at times constraining – 
impacts of inherited institutions and practices within China. This multi-dimensional process in 
turn offers an important prism through which to evaluate socioeconomic reforms in post-Mao 
China.   
 
The geopolitical backdrop to policy mobility 
The picture often portrayed of ‘feverish’ China-Singapore lesson drawing and policy transfers 
in the 1980s starkly contrasts bilateral relations of the 1960s. Just as Singapore attained 
independence in 1965 after leaving the Malaysian federation, Mao Zedong was about to 
launch the ‘Great Cultural Revolution of the Proletariat’ across China. At the time, the CPC 
still officially subscribed to the Leninist internationalist logic that a complete transition to a 
Communistic end-state was premised on ‘liberating’ the entire international community from 
capitalistic-imperialistic exploitation. To attain this objective, the CPC launched its own 
version of policy transfer through supporting insurgent movements across Southeast Asia. In 
the Malay peninsula, this process was to be facilitated by the Communist Party of Malaya 
                                           
13
 See Yu 2015. 
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(CPM), termed by a recently-declassified US government document as “the agent of the 
Communist Party of China”14.  
The CPM first embarked on campaigns to overthrow the British colonial government 
between 1948 and 1960, a period also known as the Malayan Emergency15. When this failed, 
its leader, Chin Peng, fled to China in 1960 and began directing operations from Beijing. The 
CPM operated a radio station in Hunan province known as the Suara Revolusi Malaya (Voice 
of Malayan Revolution). Broadcasts aimed at Malaya complemented clandestine local cells 
that worked to expand loyalty to communist China through guerrilla and psychological 
warfare16. A particular target audience was a group of ethno-nationalistic Chinese in Malaya 
who, in Wang’s observation, refused assimilation and “wanted all Chinese to be completely 
and passionately dedicated to the welfare of China and China alone”17.  
Opposing this warfare was Lee Kuan Yew, the first Prime Minister of Singapore. After 
witnessing the destruction caused by Japanese colonialism and then communistic radicalism 
in the 1940s and 50s, Lee became a staunch nationalist and strongly opposed communism. 
His primary political goal was to create a meritocratic ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ when Singapore 
was a part of Malaysia from 1963 to 1965, and following enforced separation, for an 
independent Singaporean identity 18 . To ensure that newly-independent Singapore could 
survive without an economic hinterland, the Lee administration worked at attracting and 
embedding transnational capital. This stance was summarized in no uncertain terms: 
“Singapore will survive, will trade with the whole world and will remain non Communist”19. 
Lee’s proclamation effectively integrated the city-state within the very expansionary system 
of capitalism that the CPC, then at the apex of ultra-leftist fervor, sought to negate. In 
addition, this integration process would have nothing to do with “communism”, which meant 
the exclusion of political economies like China and the Soviet bloc. Unsurprisingly, Radio 
                                           
14
 Planning Coordination Group, USA. 1955. “Overseas Chinese students and an Asian university”. 18 
August. Classification: secret.  
15
 Stockwell, 1993; Ramakrishna, 2002. 
16
 Cheah 2009; Wang and Ong 2009; cf. Chin and Hack 2004. 
17
 Wang 1970, 11); cf. Chang 1980. 
18
 Singapore Ministry of Culture, 31 May 1965. 
19
 Press Conference, City Hall; 26 August 1965. 
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Beijing and the CPM broadcasts began to label Lee and his “clique” as imperialist “running 
dogs” 20 . Sino-Singaporean relations were tense, to say the least, and Singaporean 
policymakers viewed Chinese foreign policy with immense suspicion. 
 This frosty standoff thawed gradually after the US President Richard Nixon visited 
Beijing in 1972 and met with the-then CPC Chairman, Mao Zedong. Prior to that, as a 
recently declassified “Outline Plan of Operations” from Washington reveals, the US 
government implored its representatives to impress on “local Chinese” in Malaya and 
Singapore that “help from ‘Mother China’ would be inviting a fate such as Hungary, North 
Korea and Viet Minh; that Russia and China impose special harsh treatment upon their 
colonies, and upon home grown communist leaders after the takeover; and that being drawn 
into a communist system will lower present living standards and enslave the people”21. With 
the US taking the lead in engaging this “communist system”, the Lee administration began to 
respond to these foreign policy shifts. "We thought it would be foolish”, recounts former 
Home Affairs Minister Wong Kan Seng, “not to go and see what China had to offer. So we 
sent our people there…to understand what was going on”22.  
Despite this newfound enthusiasm, Lee was keen from the outset to emphasize 
Singapore was neither an ethnic nor a geopolitical outpost of China. Underpinning this 
emphasis was sensitivity to Southeast Asian geopolitics: the CPM remained an active – 
albeit fragmented – secessionist force in the Malay peninsula, while the Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI) had just been brutally purged (which led in turn to the collapse of the 
Sukarno administration).  And as Lee observed at a 1973 Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting in Ottawa, Singaporean policymakers had to overtly allay international 
concerns that the city-state was not a territorial extension of China23. Lee further affirmed the 
distinction between ‘Chinese’ and ‘Singaporeans’ in his historic meeting with Mao Zedong in 
May 1976 (ref. Figure 1). Former politician Lee Khoon Choy, one of several Chinese-
                                           
20
 Ref. Latif 2007, 52; Ong 2015, 87-88. 
21
 US Operations Coordinating Board, 1957. Outline Plan of Operations with respect to Singapore and 
the Federation of Malaya. Classification: Top Secret. 
22
 The Straits Times 1995. “The evolution of a policy on China.” 17 June. 
23
 Lee 1973, 3. National Archives of Singapore.  
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educated personnel to be co-opted as Lee Kuan Yew’s ‘lieutenants’, puts the latter’s position 
in clear perspective: 
In 1976, when I arranged for Lee to visit China…we saw Mao Zedong, who was already 
mentally and physically frail. Lee’s delegation consisted of 17 members. Other than 
Rajaratnam [then Foreign Minister] and me, the group included Malay Parliamentary Secretary 
Ahmad Mattar. It was to show that the visit was not meant to be a “kinsmen Chinese” visit of 
Singapore ministers. The mixed group served to allay fears or suspicion by Singapore’s 
neighbours.
24
  
 
                                           
24
 The Straits Times 2013. “Descendents influenced by the soil.” 6 July. 
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Figure 1. Mao Zedong (third from right) meets Lee Kuan Yew (second from right): the first time a 
Chinese leader received a foreign leader of Chinese ethnicity (People’s Daily, 13 May 1976) 
Source: People’s Daily Archive.
12 
 
Although no significant foreign policy breakthrough emerged from the Mao-Lee meeting, it 
softened the Sino-Singaporean standoff and generated gradual modifications in Singapore’s 
foreign policy towards the so-called ‘Communist spectre’ in Southeast Asia. A new position 
was subsequently presented by then Singaporean Foreign Minister, S. Rajaratnam, in an 
address to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in July 1977: 
Within our own countries we must continue to fight our communists because in every one of 
the ASEAN countries the people have made it abundantly clear that Communism is not for 
them. But outside of ASEAN the question of whether a government is or is not Communist is 
irrelevant. The only test is whether it is friendly or unfriendly; whether it is under a compulsion 
to liberate us from ourselves or leave it to each of us to seek the better life our own way…I 
think today and in the future great powers will seek friends and allies not on the basis of 
increasingly irrelevant ideological affinities but on the basis of national interests.
25
  
 
This shift from ideological internationalism to political realism established the platform for a 
“friendly” Deng Xiaoping to launch the previously mentioned visit to Southeast Asia in 1978. 
The Singapore media, as was Lee Kuan Yew in several subsequent interviews, was keen to 
portray Deng’s visit as an eye-opening experience (ref. Figure 2). Judging from Deng’s 
October 1979 address to domestic policymakers, this portrayal might be largely correct: 
while plans to launch the SEZs were proposed by key cadres such as Xi Zhongxun and 
Yang Shangkun as early as 1977, the Singapore visit arguably catalysed the involvement of 
foreign capital in new rounds of socioeconomic reforms:  
I went to Singapore to understand aspects of how they utilized foreign capital. Foreigners 
established factories in Singapore and Singaporeans reaped several benefits…We must 
develop this resolve, weigh and be clear about the pros and cons, and do it even if it means 
suffering some minor losses.
26
 
                                           
25
 Rajaratnam, 1977. 
26
 Deng 1994, 199; authors’ translation; cf. Chen 2007. 
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Figure 2. The portrayal of Deng’s visit to Jurong Industrial Park in Singapore (The 
Straits Times, 14 Nov 1978) 
Source: Singapore Library Archives
14 
 
The commitment to learn from Singapore entailed a policy about-turn that illustrated 
Deng’s chameleon-like approach to governance. As the memoirs of Chin Peng, then leader 
of the CPM, reveal, it was Deng who, in 1961, instructed Chin to not only maintain but 
intensify military struggle in the Malay peninsula when the CPM was planning to wind up its 
operations27. The goal was twofold. Apart from spreading communistic revolution to other 
parts of Asia, the CPC also tried to drive and draw on ethno-nationalism; following Lee Kuan 
Yew’s request, however, it was the same Deng who mandated Chin to cease the CPM radio 
broadcasts immediately. This sharp reversal underscored the classic ‘black cat, yellow cat’ 
instrumentalism Deng first promulgated in the 1960s – any cat that is capable of catching 
mice is a good cat. And the “mice” Deng really wanted since the early 1960s was economic 
rejuvenation. After phasing out communistic internationalization, the Deng administration 
intensified a process that was unthinkable just a decade earlier – global economic 
integration28. 
Most prominent of Sino-Singaporean exchanges in the 1980s was the 1985 
appointment of Goh Keng Swee, the former Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore, as the 
advisor on coastal development and tourism to the State Council of China29. Despite this 
engagement, lesson drawing from Singapore remained largely on the ‘inspiration’ realm 
throughout the 1980s (ref. section 2). Concrete policy transfers to particular cities, if and 
when they occurred, were neither tailored by Singapore-based agencies nor intended for 
nationwide adaptation. This was due primarily to the legacy of the urban-rural dual structure: 
80% of the population were categorized as ‘rural’ at the onset of the 1978 ‘reform and 
liberalization’, and Deng’s domestic emphasis was to increase both productivity and 
enthusiasm through reforming rural production30.  
 
 
                                           
27
 Chin 2003. 
28
 Ref. Heaton 1982; Chen 2005. 
29
 Desker and Kwa 2011; Zheng and Wong 2013. 
30
 Oi 1999; Bramall 2007. 
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The year 1989 proved to be the crucial watershed of transformative change in Sino-
Singaporean relations. For the leaders of Singapore and other ASEAN political economies, 
lingering suspicions of China eased following the surrender of the CPM in southern Thailand 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In view of this underlying concern 
with the ‘communist spectre’ in Southeast Asia, Singaporean foreign policymakers opted not 
to establish formal diplomatic relations with China until October 1990, two months after the 
Suharto government of Indonesia did likewise31. Within China, the massive social instability 
leading up to and after the military crackdown on civilian protesters in Tiananmen Square on 
4 June triggered strong reflections on the effects and future trajectories of post-1978 
socioeconomic reforms. The conjuncture was thus characterized by a strange mix of 
improved foreign relations with domestic socioeconomic chaos: as foreign fears of the ‘China 
threat’ were allayed and laid new foundations for cross-border collaborations, a growing 
range of social problems in both rural and urban areas demanded resolution. Specifically, 
Deng Xiaoping and his successor, Jiang Zemin, urgently needed new approaches to manage 
the intensifying urbanization that accompanied market-oriented reforms and, consequently, 
assuage concerns by the strong conservative faction that deepening reforms would 
exacerbate political dissent.  
Against this backdrop, Deng reaffirmed the regulatory experiences of Singapore as a 
potential developmental prototype during his 1992 ‘southern tour’. What he sought was a 
pragmatic resolution to the domestic crisis, and as Huff argues, Singapore offered a “reliable” 
model for emulation: “Perhaps the most important reason why interventionism succeeded in 
Singapore was because of a pragmatism – the test of what works – rather than rigid 
ideological commitment to a free market or to state direction”32. Contrary to the more informal 
learning of the 1980s, what followed since the 1990s were successive waves of lesson-
drawing campaigns and policy transfers that collectively constituted the ‘Singapore fever’. 
These were accompanied by a consistent rhetorical commitment from the Chinese party-
                                           
31
 Ref. Tan 2009. 
32
 Huff 1995b, 1435. 
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state to learn from Singapore, even as both the PRC and Singapore’s strategic and 
economic circumstances evolved and changed at the global scale33. The Chinese party-state, 
it appeared at the time, was very serious in formulating a Singapore-styled reform blueprint.  
 
 
 
The realities of lesson drawing and policy transfers 
Institutionalized learning in Singapore: effectiveness & constraints 
The first concrete expression of lesson drawing from Singapore arguably began in 1992 with 
the introduction of bespoke programmes for Chinese public servants in the Nanyang 
Technological University (NTU). The choice of NTU as the first institution of teaching-cum-
learning for visiting CPC cadres is interesting: it occupies the site of what had been formerly 
known as Nanyang University, the first university outside China (including Taiwan) that 
offered Chinese-language tertiary education for ethnic-Chinese from Southeast Asia. First 
driven by Tan Lark Sye and launched in 1955 with the assistance of private donors, Nanyang 
University had in fact become a hotbed of pro-communist activism in the mid-1960s34 . 
Concerns over communist-ideology slippage into mainstream society prompted the 
Singapore government to ultimately terminate the exclusively Chinese-based educational 
system in Nanyang University in 198035.  
Yet, one might speculate that the subsequent Singaporean choice to pitch NTU as an 
attractive training ground for Communist Party cadres from China was connected precisely to 
that vexed heritage from the 1960s. Indeed, the then- NTU president, Su Guaning, even 
proposed renaming NTU as Nanyang University in the mid-2000s. The CPC on its part did 
not specifically indicate they wanted to engage NTU until an official agreement on lesson 
drawing’ was drawn up in April 2001. While the renaming bid proved unsuccessful, the 
symbolism of NTU’s collaboration with the CPC should not be lost on observers of Sino-
Singaporean relations: it revived and fulfilled one core objective of the original Nanyang 
                                           
33
 cf. Huang and Lou 2014 
34
 van der Kroef 1964, 1967. 
35
 Yao 2008; cf. Zahari 2007, chapter 14. 
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University – the use of Chinese-language syllabi for advanced studies outside China – 
almost four decades after its establishment. 
As enrolment in these courses expanded, NTU developed the first overseas Master’s 
programme for higher-ranked Chinese officials in 1998. While the medium of instruction for 
most courses in NTU is English, the two Masters programs for Chinese officials – namely the 
Master of Science in Managerial Economics (MME) and Master of Public Administration 
(MPA) – are both taught predominantly in Mandarin. Both programmes are dubbed the 
'Mayor's Class' (shizhang ban 市長班) in China today. As these programs became popular, 
NTU set up the Nanyang Centre for Public Administration (NCPA) in December 2009 to offer 
executive training for senior Chinese civil servants. By 2014, more than 1200 mid- and 
senior-level government officials from China have been trained, with many receiving 
promotions upon their return to China36.  
This longstanding relationship took on more concrete institutional expressions after 
the Chinese Central Organisation Department and various municipal party committees 
named NTU the best overseas institution for the training of Chinese government officials. In 
2011, NTU was certified by The People’s Republic of China’s State Administration of Foreign 
Experts Affairs (SAFEA) as an overseas expert organisation and training institution. With this 
certification, NTU was authorised to conduct personnel exchange programmes for Chinese 
officials. In 2010, the NUS joined NTU in receiving Chinese officials to its professional 
program at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. Only senior CPC cadres that are 
section chiefs with at least 10 years of working experience can be accepted. These 
strengthening linkages between the Chinese party-state and Singapore-based academic 
institutions collectively exemplify a sustained preference on the part of the CPC for emulating 
and drawing inspirations from Singaporean regulatory policies (cf. section 2).  
The intensification of knowledge exchange and formalized learning positively 
impacted CPC cadres across the party-state structure. For instance, cadres of the 
municipality of Shanghai and the city of Qinhuangdao published a two-volume book reflecting 
                                           
36
 NTU 2014; for an overview of the demographic makeup of the officials, see Yu, Rubin and Wu, 2012. 
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on their experience in Singapore and how they could adapt best practices 37 . This 
corresponded with discussions on the connections between the Singapore experience and 
the importance of the rule of law38; the lessons to be drawn from the Singaporean Central 
Provident Fund 39 ; and the factors of benevolent governance40 . In 2007, the-then Party 
Secretary of Guangdong, Wang Yang, called on Shenzhen municipal officials to “be daring in 
matching up to the model of Singapore” (jiaoban xinjiapo 叫板新加坡). A large number of 
delegates were subsequently mobilized on learning visits to the city-state, and in November 
2008 Shenzhen University launched a new centre on Singapore studies41. When Lee Hsien 
Loong visited Shenzhen in 2014, the Shenzhen Mayor, Wang Rong, proudly proclaimed the 
results of this ‘matching up’: “amongst the cities across China trying to learn from Singapore, 
Shenzhen is one of the closest and the best”42.  
At the national level, the current Xi Jinping administration has established a 
consensus to emulate and hybridize Singaporean policies. Citing an unnamed political 
theorist who consulted the CPC on new ways to emulate Singaporean policies, the New York 
Times reported that Xi had a low profile meeting with Lee Kuan Yew at the beach resort of 
Beidaihe in October 2010 after learning he was to assume the next Chinese presidency43. 
Lee, then Minister Mentor in the Singapore parliament, had met earlier with Jiang Zemin, the 
CPC leader who oversaw the first wave of ‘software transfers’ in the 1990s. According to the 
report, Xi and Jiang agreed after meeting Lee “to try to adopt the Singapore model down the 
road”44. Xi visited Singapore a month later, and in 2011 General Liu Yazhou, an advocate of 
party reform, dispatched a team of military officers to live in Singapore and prepare a study.  
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Following these initial visits, a policy agenda developed by the Development 
Research Centre of the Chinese State Council (DRC) for the first Third Plenum to be chaired 
by Xi (in November 2013) explicitly recommended state asset management reforms (guozi 
gaige) to be modelled on Temasek Holdings, one of the two holding-cum-investment vehicles 
financed directly by the Singapore government. It was soon announced that this 
recommendation will be adopted45. A cryptically-named “Small Learning Group” (xuexi xiaozu 
学习小组) affirmed the potential of the ‘Singapore model’ through an editorial in the party 
mouthpiece People’s Daily:  
The leadership team of Xi Jinping is currently searching for an effective developmental model. 
To China, the Singapore model allows for more liberal economic policies to coexist with one-
party governance, this point is very attractive. In addition, Singapore has shaken off the 
‘middle income trap’ successfully, this is another area especially worthy of learning.
46
 
 
In spite of these concrete engagements and rhetorical commitments, analysts have 
documented strong obstacles to actualizing lessons drawn from Singapore. According to Fan 
Lei, a researcher at the Charhar Institute in Inner Mongolia, CPC cadres found it difficult to 
accommodate the Singaporean experience in China: 
Context is an important factor to consider when learning from Singapore. More than 50,000 
government officials have been trained in Singapore over the past 20 years. This is a 
considerable figure; on average every township would have an official who has been to 
Singapore. Yet it has been more than 20 years since the first batch of officials returned from 
Singapore, and the impact of ‘learning’ is not at all clear. Why is it that so many officials were 
sent in search of ‘holy scriptures’ (qujing 取经) for dissemination at home, only to have them 
return and revert to their old ways?
47
  
 
Zheng Yongnian, a Singapore-based political analyst of China-Singapore relations, offers a 
similar observation: 
Take the social housing construction in China for instance, it is an example of failed learning 
from Singapore. Although housing reforms in China are always portrayed as learning from 
Singapore’s housing institution, that is to allow the majority of the people to buy their own 
housing, in practice what goes on is land-financed development, it is to rule through real 
estate development. The same situation [of failed learning] can be said of the provident fund 
institution.
48
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Underpinning “failed learning” was arguably the short-termist developmental outlook known 
colloquially as ‘GDP-ism’. Following the gradual implementation of market-like rule, local 
CPC cadres gained more autonomy in driving growth. They were then impelled to increase 
extra-budgetary fiscal revenue after the 1994 national fiscal reforms granted a larger 
apportionment of locally-collected taxes to the central government. The consequent 
prioritization of capital-friendly initiatives over social service provision (especially for migrant 
workers) became a structural barrier for the successful implementation of Singapore-styled 
development.   
Obstacles to direct borrowing are also shaped by the politics of scale within the 
administrative structure. This is made clear in a candid reflection by the Singapore PM, Lee 
Hsien Loong, on attempts in Shanghai to adopt Singapore’s compensation strategy to deter 
corruption:  
I think China’s circumstances are very different from ours. Your scale is much different from 
ours. I mean, we are the equivalent of one small city. Even Shanghai has 20 million people, 
four, five times the size of Singapore. So what we do in Singapore is not so easy to do all over 
China. I once had a discussion with a vice mayor in Shanghai, and he said to me, ‘You pay 
your ministers well, and your civil servants well, properly. And if we were Shanghai, all by 
ourselves, we could do that also. But if I did that, people to the west of me would have a view, 
people to the north of me would have a view, the people to the south of me would have a view, 
the people in the center would have a view. So it is not so easy for me to move, and it’s a real 
problem, it’s a different situation.’ But in Singapore, what we have tried to do is have strict 
rules, to have transparent systems, so if there is an exercise of discretion, it cannot be 
completed without checks and balances.
49
  
 
These three preceding accounts highlight a distinct trait within the party-state apparatus in 
China, namely the need for reciprocal accountability between different administrative 
jurisdictions50. As such, one jurisdiction (Shanghai, in this case) could not act autonomously 
– which, as Lee’s account implies, refers to the implementation of “strict rules” and 
“transparent systems” across the country – without the agreement of actors located at other 
administrative levels. By extension, Singapore’s capacity to respond swiftly to global 
economic shifts (including the 2008-2009 global financial crisis) contrasts the multi-tiered, 
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consensus-driven administrative system in China51 . Singaporean policymakers’ ability to 
micro-manage social and economic affairs and simultaneously ‘scale up’ the regulatory 
outcomes to the global scale (as opposed to the provincial and central governments in China) 
has been predicated on an ‘urba-national’ entity that Olds and Yeung term the ‘global city-
state’:  
In global city-states, the (national) state has virtually direct access to the global economy. 
State policies can be shaped to develop the city-state into a global city-state…the political 
power and control of a developmental city-state distinguishes it from municipal governments in 
most global cities because it is able to bypass national-state/provincial-city politics typical in 
many global cities.
52
  
 
This tangible difference underscores three contrasting aspects of Chinese politico-economic 
regulation, namely the demands of maintaining a unified party-state apparatus despite 
increasing differentiation between party and bureaucratic functions; the challenge of aligning 
bottom-up initiatives after greater regulatory autonomy was delegated to local governments53; 
and the increased emphasis on policy experimentation in the post-Mao era.  
Beyond the tangible realm, the historian Fei Yong attributes the constraints to 
effective lesson drawing and policy transfers to a ‘big country mentality’ 54 , namely the 
tendency to assess others from the self. Underpinning this ‘mentality’ are two schools of 
thought. One is termed ‘neo-authoritarianism’ (xin quanwei zhuyi 新权威主义), and the other 
‘neo-Confucianism’ (xin rujia sixiang 新儒家思想). The former explores possibilities for the 
concentration of political power to drive market-based reforms, and many Chinese 
intellectuals and policymakers regard Singapore as an exemplar in this aspect. ‘Neo-
Confucianism’ was a movement predominantly driven by Tu Weiming from Harvard 
University. Paralleling Max Weber, Tu postulated that Confucianism had the same effect on 
the economic ‘rise’ of Japan and the four Asian dragons [South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and Singapore] in the same way Protestant ethics impacted the rise of capitalism. As such, 
mainland policymaking and academic circles erroneously believed Singapore was founded 
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on Confucian principles55. Uniting these two camps, Fei argues, is a distinct lack of interest in 
the Singaporean experience, but rather a tendency to advance inward-looking agendas 
through making references to Singapore. This further explains why lessons and policies 
drawn from Singapore mutated after reaching China. 
 
G-to-G projects: are geographically-targeted policy transfers effective? 
Apart from academic-based learning, specific policy transfers were and continue to be 
instituted through territorially-contained G-to-G projects. Primarily involving the integration of 
industrial park development with the provision of social amenities in targeted cities, these 
projects emerged out of a ‘software transfer’ initiative mooted by the Singapore government 
in the early 1990s. Fundamental to this arrangement is the deepening of economic relations 
through promoting policies that have proven effective in Singapore.  
In February 1994, the governments of China and Singapore signed a landmark 
collaborative agreement that formally allowed Singaporean state-linked and private agencies 
to transfer their economic management experiences with Chinese partners. These 
experiences encompass land-use planning, building control, environmental regulation, 
planning and management of industrial estates, public utilities management and labour 
management. The first designated “microcosm” was the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial 
Park (CS-SIP), a 70km2 industrial park and residential community in Suzhou. Estimated to 
cost US$20billion upon completion, the goal of the CS-SIP was to consolidate Chinese 
capacities to create investor-friendly environments for foreign capital. A consortium of 
Singapore government-linked companies took a 65% stake and a Chinese consortium the 
remaining 35%. According to Zhang Xinsheng, the-then Suzhou mayor, Suzhou was 
selected over other economic regions in China because it successfully lobbied for the 
support of the Chinese central government56.  
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Despite this support, the project was unable to meet original objectives. After the SIP 
plan was approved, the Suzhou City government re-started the development of a dormant 
project, the Suzhou New District Industrial Park (SND). This was clearly a competitive, if not 
cannibalistic, measure: the SND was geographically-proximate to the SIP. With a majority 
stake in the SND, the Suzhou City largely ignored the SIP and concentrated on promoting 
the SND instead. The-then Suzhou vice-Mayor, Wang Jinhua, went to Germany and advised 
investors to invest directly in the SND rather than the SIP because it was not only more cost-
effective, but also because the-then Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, did not favour the G-to-
G project in the first place57. This aggressive approach reportedly caused the CS-SIP to lose 
US$77 million between 1994 and 200158. After repeated requests for assurances that local 
Suzhou officials were not undercutting the G-to-G project, Lee Kuan Yew went on CNN in 
June 1999 to announce the Singapore consortium would be pulling out59. Shortly after this 
interview, Lee elaborated on the Singapore pullback: 
We would have liked to stay, but not in the way events have developed. It isn't worth our while 
to go on with it and have constant friction. And it's not just over costs – it's over ways of doing 
things…The problem was to change work styles, work habits and systems. So, I think it's best 
that they decide what to pick and choose and adapt to their systems.
60
 
 
The friction was officially resolved in 2001. The Singapore consortium lowered its stake to 
35%, raised the Chinese consortium’s stake to 65%, and reduced its involvement in the 
construction from a planned 70 km2 to just 8 km2.  Yet a part of Lee arguably felt point-to-
point transfer and subsequent nationwide adaptation was possible had the Chinese central 
government ensured the project received absolute “special attention” 61 . This setback 
triggered reflections by key Singaporean policymakers involved in the project, which in turn 
revealed the difficulties confronting CPC attempts at emulating, hybridizing or transplanting 
policies from Singapore. To George Yeo, the-then Singapore Minister for Trade and Industry, 
the primary impediment of successful policy transfers was cultural differences: 
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Fundamentally, the problem of Suzhou is a cultural problem. To a certain extent, for China to 
modernise, some of its cultural characteristics must change. But will China become like 
Singapore? That’s impossible…There are some things that China can benefit from studying 
the Singapore experiment, but there are many things which are irrelevant because conditions 
are different. The difficulty of the Suzhou project, I think, has proved that we are different from 
the Chinese. This also gives us some comfort that the success formula of Singapore is not 
easily copied. If we're so easily copied, then we'll be under competitive pressure very quickly. 
But because the Singapore model is not easily copied, what we have is an enduring 
advantage, not an ephemeral thing.
62
  
 
For Lim and Chan Soo Sen, the first CEO of CS-SIP, differences in perceptions of contracts 
and policies – and by extension, the rule of law – were a major issue: 
The way we look at a contract or an agreement is quite different from how the Chinese look at 
it. Once signed, we have every intention to stick to the contract but they don't. They are quite 
happy to come back and see what they can do to re-negotiate some terms or to get out of 
some obligations. But you can't change the Chinese mentality and Chinese system overnight
63
.  
 
In Singapore, policies are very explicit, down to the last detail. But China is too big. If a policy 
is too explicit and not open to interpretation, it becomes useless because every province will 
have exceptions and need to be exempted at different points. Therefore, Chinese policies are 
more general. Far better to state the spirit of the policy rather than to document the exact 
details.
64
 
 
Of particular interest is the gradual success of the SIP after the Singapore-based firms 
engaged in more intense tacit knowledge transfer. As Inkpen and Pien show, the Suzhou 
policymakers responded competitively because of perceived “asymmetric collaborative 
incentives”65. It was only after the local consortium was given more control that the SIP 
began generating profits and became re-emphasized as a policy template for industrial park 
development across China. This corresponds with Lim Neo Chian’s observation and 
underscores an important aspect of the policy transfer process: subnational policymakers are 
not passive agents who respond mechanically to central injunctions. Where their vested 
interests are not aligned, they could sidestep or undercut existing arrangements.  
Empirically, the crucial question is whether the Suzhou experience – particularly the 
“cultural problem”, to re-borrow George Yeo’s term – would re-emerge in the second Sino-
Singaporean G-to-G project. Named the Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco City (SSTEC), this 30 
km2 project was launched in 2008 at the eastern border of Tianjin, a centrally-governed 
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municipality of 15 million people. While the total investment remains undisclosed, project 
officials claim 40 billion yuan (~US$6.5 billion) was invested in fixed assets by 201266 . 
Launched against a backdrop of acute environmental pollution and income inequality, the 
Tianjin Eco-City project represents an ongoing concern with environmentally unsustainable 
urbanization. Recounting the formation of this project, former Singaporean PM Goh explains:  
China at that time was emphasising the environment, green development, urbanisation without 
too much pollution. So, we had the expertise in Singapore, so I was able to align our expertise 
with China’s interest of wanting to have a clean environment for its urbanisation.
67
  
 
Despite these top-level commitments, it remains unclear if transfers between Singapore and 
Tianjin could, in Goh’s terms, actualize their proponents’ visions of “replication” (fuzhi 复制) 
and “expansion” (tuiguang 推广)68. Through a comparative study with Dongtan Eco-City in 
Shanghai, Miao and Lang conclude central governmental support explains why the Tianjin 
Eco-City kept running while the Dongtan project failed69. Even so, differences in opinions on 
what constitutes an ‘eco city’ between the Chinese and Singaporean partners became 
apparent. As an investigative news report reveals, regulatory short-termism endures in the 
Tianjin Eco-City project. While Singaporean planners would like to have Housing Board-style 
public housing that catered to low-income Chinese, Tianjin Eco-City officials were reportedly 
lukewarm to the idea of uncertainty over the costs of subsidizing the apartments70. A Tianjin 
official whispered in the ear of a Singaporean colleague:  
By the time the public housing project is completed, many of us Tianjin officials would likely be 
promoted elsewhere. Who would still be around to ensure that it is really the poor people who 
are relocated to this public housing estate?
71
 
 
As an unnamed staff member of SSTEC adds, policy transfers could succeed only if they 
were aligned to local officials’ agendas: 
We have very strong high-level government links – but not with officials at the lower and 
provincial levels. It's the Tianjin officials' support we need to get things done – be it focusing 
only on green projects, building a light-rail transit line in the Eco-City or creating a community 
mix of different income groups.
72
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New research is beginning to demonstrate policy mutation in the Tianjin Eco-City. Comparing 
the Tianjin project with Masdar City in Abu Dhabi, Caprotti illustrated the importance of 
probing beneath the association of Chinese eco-cities with functionality, rationality and 
efficiency73. While Goh Chok Tong correctly depicted the Chinese party-state’s concern with 
environmental quality, Caprotti argues that the “motivation behind new [eco-city] projects 
seems to be green in the financial sense only”74. This finding overlaps that of Miao and Lang: 
not only were the original objectives of the Tianjin Eco-City revised to more modest levels, 
they were more closely aligned with economic objectives75. Caprotti et al further demonstrate 
how this G-to-G project “is discursively constructed as ecologically beneficial for its 
inhabitants rather than for the broader socio-environmental landscape” 76 . These studies 
collectively foreground a technocratic, a-political and ultimately economistic approach to 
lesson drawing and policy transfers in Tianjin Eco-City. Politically-sensitive issues that 
require urgent attention like intra-urban social polarization, institutionalized social 
segmentation and entrenched vested interests in pollutive industries have not been explicitly 
encompassed by the ‘eco’ and ‘sustainable’ concepts.  
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Table 1. Sino-Singaporean lesson drawing and policy transfers: an overview 
 
Policy 
domain 
Characteristics & Objectives Key actors & institutions Spatial 
scale of 
transfer 
Type of 
transfer (ref. 
section 2) 
Constraints to transfer 
Industrial 
park 
develop-
ment & 
manage-
ment 
 Integral aspect of inter-
governmental agreement in 1994 
to facilitate ‘software transfer’, or 
expertise in producing a pro-
investor climate 
 G-to-G projects first launched in 
Suzhou in 1994; now extended to 
Tianjin (2008) & Chongqing 
(2015)  
 Singapore government-linked 
corporations (GLCs) involved in 
several other joint-ventures (e.g. 
Guangzhou Knowledge City & 
Jilin Food Zone) 
 
 Government of Singapore 
 Jurong Town Corporation 
 Multiple state-linked 
agencies in Singapore 
(e.g. EDB, URA, HDB, 
PUB) 
 Proactive officials from 
designated local 
governments in China like 
Wang Yang, Zhang Gaoli 
& Huang Qifan 
 Chinese SOEs 
 
 Intra-urban  Hybrid: co-
driven by 
state-linked 
actors in 
Singapore & 
specific city-
regional 
governments 
(except 
Suzhou 
Industrial 
Park) 
 
 Parallel competition by local 
governments, increasing 
risks of duplication  
 Short-termist approach to 
planning, based on the GDP-
focused institution of cadre 
performance appraisal 
Manage-
ment of 
State-
Owned 
Enterpris
es 
(SOEs) 
 Emulate strategies of Temasek 
Holdings, a government-linked 
holding company 
 Enforcement of ‘separation of 
politics from firms’ (zhengqi 
fenkai) , a principle first 
introduced in 1988 
 
 Development Research 
Centre of the State 
Council 
 Temasek Holdings 
 Centrally- & locally-
owned SOEs 
 National & 
provincial 
 Voluntary 
(initiative of 
Chinese state 
agencies) 
 
 Place-specific path 
dependencies 
 Resistance by established 
interest groups within SOEs 
& local governments 
Public 
admini-
stration 
 Increase efficiency & integrity; 
expand rule of law; reduce 
resource wastage & corruption 
 
 Nanyang Centre for 
Public Administration, 
NTU 
 Lee Kuan Yew School of 
Public Policy, NUS 
 Central & provincial 
cadres 
 National 
selection, 
Singapore-
based 
training  
 Voluntary 
(initiative of 
Chinese state 
agencies) 
 
 Interlocked & entrenched 
party-SOE connections 
 Excessive emphasis on 
extra-budgetary financing, 
creating a colossal ‘grey 
zone’ in fund-sourcing 
      
 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
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Conclusion 
Much has been made within China of the principle of “learning” from Singapore. Yet the 
aggregation of lesson drawing and policy transfers from Singapore by China within a longer 
historical framework, as attempted in this paper, complicates the story of state-to-state policy 
mobility. Embedded herein are simultaneous copying, emulation, inspiration, hybridization 
and synthesis. That policymakers and planners from both China and Singapore believe 
some policies – such as those introduced in the G-to-G projects in Suzhou and Tianjin – are 
replicable across China indicates a belief in the possibility of copying. CPC cadres 
undergoing training in Singapore are implicitly encouraged to emulate and draw inspiration 
from key tenets of Singaporean public administration (e.g. minimal corruption, high-efficiency, 
forward-planning, respect for contractual laws, etc.). Other projects range from emulation 
(e.g. attempts to introduce the Central Provident Fund (CPF) in cities like Shanghai and 
Shenzhen) to more hybrid forms of adaptation (e.g. the ongoing attempt to repurpose the 
practices of Temasek Holdings, the Singaporean sovereign wealth fund and holding 
company of state-linked enterprises). Within the senior CPC echelon, the overarching 
characteristic of ‘learning’ is to draw inspiration for devising new regulatory solutions on the 
basis of one-party authoritarianism and global economic integration (see summary in Table 
1).  
On the one hand, this multi-faceted attempt at learning from the ‘Singapore model’ 
indicates an underlying belief that place-specific policies are transferable in different forms. It 
recalibrates notions of ‘Chinese exceptionalism’ by showing how the dynamic interaction 
with foreign policies and practices constituted post-Mao reforms. On the other hand, 
enduring institutional aspects of the Chinese experience arguably became more pronounced 
after overt and tacit attempts to learn from Singapore. As Table 1 shows, constraints to 
transfer are evident in each policy domain. This underscores, in turn, how the evolution of 
the Chinese political economy is not predicated on a fixed playbook of policy and practice. If 
some commentators claim Chinese policymakers are exporting an internally-coherent 
developmental ‘model’ to less developed political economies in Africa, Latin America and 
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central Asia, the Singapore connection actually underscores how post-Mao reforms remain 
an open-ended process of policy experimentation and adaptation that is fraught with tension 
and resistance77.  
Two defining aspects could be abstracted from this multifaceted process of policy 
mobility and mutation. First, the ‘authoritarianism’ of the Singapore context has been 
qualitatively different from its Chinese variant. Socioeconomic regulation in Singapore was 
and remains predicated on the principle that no entity – including the ruling party – is above 
the law. Across China, the CPC technically controls the legislative system, which renders it 
at once within and outside the legal system. This positioning injected significant flexibility in 
the interpretation and implementation of law amongst cadres. Second, intense competition 
between Chinese municipal governments has undermined Singapore’s foreign-investor and 
knowledge-purveyor primacy. Ironically, as the Suzhou and Tianjin cases reveal, local 
projects launched by the central government in the name of the ‘national interest’ mattered 
only if such projects could be credited to local officials. In Suzhou, the SIP could show 
improved results only after more benefits – albeit in the form of tacit knowledge – were 
offered to local stakeholders. And emerging evidence suggests local officials in Tianjin are 
behaving similarly.  
Given the unclear effects of policy transfers to date, why do Chinese policymakers – 
from local officials to Xi Jinping – continue to proclaim the importance of learning from 
Singapore? The most plausible rationale could be political. In the process of policy 
formulation and/or modification, it may be more palatable to cite an Asian rather than 
western developmental inspiration, especially when that Asian trajectory includes a positive 
record of incorporating western best practices. Indeed, while many observers in China 
recognize Japan as the Asian exemplar of successful ‘westernization’, its bitter historical 
relationship with China renders politically impossible any overt learning attempt. Whether 
lessons are truly learnt; whether policies are truly transferred; and, indeed, whether China 
truly possesses the geo-historical conditions that made possible the Singaporean economic 
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success since the mid-1960s are arguably secondary considerations78. What matters is the 
appearance that change is coming; that change is not directionless but ‘modelled’ after 
global best practices. During the late Qing era, the ‘model’ was Japan; the Soviet Union 
represented ‘China’s tomorrow’ to the Mao administration; for Deng and his successors, the 
explicit ‘modelling’ focus has shifted to Singapore, a city-state in Southeast Asia no bigger 
than Shunyi district of Beijing.  
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